

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1175

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, UK

SUBJECT: UK ANALYSIS OF FUTURE SOVIET POLICY

DURING THE MARCH 4 POLADS THE UK REP (MARGETSON) DISTRIBUTED
THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS ENTITLED "SOVIET WESTPOLITIK AFTER THE
CSCE AND MEETINGS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES." TEXT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. EVIDENCE IS STARTING TO BUILD UP ABOUT SOVIET POLICY
TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPE AFTER THE FONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE). TWO MEETINGS OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN HELD IN PREPARATION FOR THE FONFERENCE
OF EUROPEAN PARTIES IN EAST BERLIN LATER THIS YEAR. THE LANGUAGE
USED ON SUCH OCCASIONS IS OFTEN RATHER THEORETICAL, BUT THE
SUBJECTS UNDER DISCUSSION ARE THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF EASE-
WEST RELATIONS, THE SHORT - AND MEDIUM - TERM GOALS OF THE
SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE AND THE TACTICS WHICH THE RUSSIANS
WILL ADOPT IN PURSUIT OF THESE.

2. THE TWO PREPARATORY MEETINGS WERE ATTENDED BY ALL THE COMMUNIST
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PARTIES OF EUROPE EXCEPT THOSE OF ALBANIA, ICELAND AND THE
NETHERLANDS WHO WERE ABSENT FOR DOCTRINAL REASONS. THE FIRST
MEETING, HELD IN WARSAW ON 16-18 OCTOBER, DID LITTLE MORE THAN
TAKE A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE THAT A CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD

IN EAST BERLIN BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF 1975. THIS SEEMS TO POINT TO A DATE IN MAY TO COINCIDE WITH THE CELEBRATIONS DUE TO BE HELD IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, TO MARK THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEFEAT OF FASCISM. BUT THE EVENTUAL TIMEING MAY BE INFLUENCED BY DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CSCE; AT WARSAW THE SOVIET DELEGATE SAID THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE HELD AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE. THE SECOND MEETING, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN BUDAPEST ON 19-21 DECEMBER, HAD TWO TASKS: TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE OUTLINE OF THE EVENTUAL CONFERENCE, AND TO DECIDE WHAT DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE ISSUED AT IT. THERE WAS SOME CONSENSUS ON THE FIRST POINT AND AN APPARENT COMPROMISE ON THE SECOND.

3. THE CONFERENCE IN EAST BERLIN SEEMS TO BE PROMPTED BY TWO CONSIDERATIONS. THE FIRST IS THE NEED TO DRAW UP GENERAL LINES OF COMMUNIST POLICY IN AND TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPE IN THE NEW PHASE BEGINNING AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE. THE SECOND AND MORE ACUTE QUESTION IS HOW THE WARSAW PACT AND INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES SHOULD RESPOND TO THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS AFFECTING THE WEST.

4. THE LATTER POSES PROBLEMS BOTH AT THE STATE AND PARTY LEVEL:

(A) IS IT RIGHT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES STILL TO PURSUE DETENTE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH THE WEST? DO NOT THESE POLICIES HAVE THE EFFECT OF GIVING BLOOD TRANSFUSION TO THE AILING CAPITALIST SYSTEM?

(B) WHAT IN PRACTICE SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE? THEIR DOCTRINES ARE BEING DAILY VINDICATED, BUT MANY OF THEM ARE AS DISTANT AS EVER FROM THE SEATS OF POWER.

5. THE ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS EMERGED FROM THE SPEECHES OF THE MAJOR PERFORMERS AT BUCHAREST, ESPECIALLY PONOMAREV (SOVIET UNION), BABIUCH (POLAND), BILAK (CZECHOSLOVAKIA), MARKOWSKI (GDR) AND KADAR AND PULLAI (HUNGARY). THERE WERE MANY NUANCES AND DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS, BUT THE GENERAL LINE WAS THE SAME.
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6. THESE SPEAKERS ALL SAID IN EFFECT THAT THE POLICY OF DETENTE IS RIGHT AND MUST BE CONTINUED. IT WAS STATED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD PROCEEDED FROM PRINCIPLED CLASS POSITIONS WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY (PONOMAREV). EAST-WEST ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION HELPED THE WORKING MAN IN THE WEST, NOT CAPITALISM AS SUCH (PONOMAREV AGAIN). THE PEACH OFFENSIVE OF SOCIALISM WAS CREATING MORE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES (MARKOWSKI). THERE MUST BE AN ORGANIC MERGING OF THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE WITH THE STRIVING FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS (BILAK). THE IMPRESSION LEFT BY SUCH LAUGUAGE IS THAT THE COMMUNIST LEADERS DO INDEED SEE A CERTAIN CONTRADICTION HERE, BUT HAVE NO INTENTION OF DROPPING DETENTE FOR THE SAKE OF THE

CLASS STRUGGLE.

7. THERE WERE SOME HINTS OF SOVIET POLICY AFTER THE CSCE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE CSCE WOULD NOT EXHAUST THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (BILAK). THE INFLUENCE OF THE POPULAR MASSES ON FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE INTENSIFIED (MARKOWSKI). THE COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE MUST TAKE A STAND ON THE VIENNA TALKS ON MBFR (PONOMAREV). THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT "SHOULD CATEGORICALLY COME OUT AGAINST ALL PLANS FOR THE CREATION, ALONGSIDE NATO, OF NEW MILITARY "INTEGRATIONS" PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR ONES, AS DEMANDED BY THE EXTREME ANTI-PEACE FORCES WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET", AND "THE CONCEPT OF CLOSED ECONOMIC GROUPINGS SHOULD BE DROPPED" (BABIUCH). THESE ARE THE THEMES OF THE "ALL EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM" AND OF "ALL EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION", WHICH HAVE FIGURED IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDS FOR MANY YEARS. WHEN EXAMINED, THEY TURN OUT TO MEAN THAT WESTERN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION MUST BE DROPPED, WHILE THAT IN EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD CONTINUE.

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8. A NEW AND SLIGHTLY SURPRISING SUGGESTION WAS THAT THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SHOULD HENCEFORTH IDENTIFY ITS ENEMIES. THUS PONOMAREV FELT THAT "THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NAME THE ENEMIES OF DETENTE", AND THIS IDEA WAS ECHOED BY BILAK. IT IS AN UNUSUAL POINT TO FIND IN SUCH SPEECHES. COMMUNISTS NORMALLY PREFER TO SPEAK DARKLY BUT IMPRECISELY OF "CERTAIN CIRCLES" AND THE LIKE. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER IN FUTURE ONE SHOULD EXPECT TO SEE MORE DIRECT ATTACKS UPON RIGHT-WING PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, OR WHETHER PONOMAREV MEANT THAT THE EVENTUAL CONFERENCE IN EAST BERLIN MUST PUT CHINA IN THE DOCK. HIS WARNING AGAINST "EURO-CENTRISM" PERHAPS SUPPORTS THE LATTER INTERPRETATION, ALTHOUGH THIS

LINE WOULD PREVENT ATTENDANCE BY MOST WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES
AND FOR THIS REASON ALONE SEEMS IMPROBABLE.

9. FOR MANY COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE CHOICE
PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS IS EITHER OPORTUNIST
CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER LEFT-WING ELEMENTS TO SECURE A SHARE OF
POWER NOW, OR FIDELITY TO PURE COMMUNIST DOCTRINE IN THE
HOPE OF SUPREME POWER AT SOME FUTURE DATE. THE LATTER COURSE
DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ADVOCATED AT BUDAPEST BY THE RUSSIANS
OR ANYONE ELSE. ON THE CONTRATY, THE MEETING WAS TOLD THAT THE
SITUATION REQUIRED THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN ANTI-WAR
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COALITION OF VARIOUS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FORCES (PONOMAREV).
DETENTE WAS A GOOD PLATFORM FOR CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND
VARIOUS SOCIAL FORCES, ABOVE ALL SOCIALISTS AND THE SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (BABIUCH). MORE EXPLICIT STILL WERE
THE REMARKS OF THE HUNGARIAN PULLAI. HE SPOKE OF THE PROCESS OF
"DIFFERENTIATION" IN SOCIAL DEMORRATIC PARTIES, WHICH SEEMS
TO MEAN SPLITS BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT-WING TENDENCIES. TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, PULLAI ADVOCATED MAKING THE MASS
BASIS BORDER, WIDENING THE CIRCLE OF ALLIES AND USING PERSUASION
AS WELL AS FLEXIBILITY TO "ATTRACT ADDITIONAL SOCIAL STRATA
TO OUR AIMS AND INVOLVE THEM IN OUR STRUGGLE OF MASSIVE PRO-
POSITIONS". PULLAI DIRECTED ATTENTION ESPECIALLY TO THE TRADE
UNIONS ("BECAUSE IT IS FROM THER THAT WE GAIN MOST OF OUR ALLIES")
AND TO ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTING WOMEN AND YOUTH.

10. THERE WERE SIGNS OF DISAGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION
OF WHAT DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE ISSUED EVENTUALLY IN EAST BERLIN.
THE BULGARIAN TELLALOV, NO DOUBT SPEAKING FROM SOVIET BRIEF,
SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO OF THESE: A POLITICAL DECLAR-
ATION AND AN APPEAL TO THE MASSES. BUT ANDREI (ROMANIA) ARGUED
RATHER FORCEFULLY THAT A SINGLE SHORT DOCUMENT WAS ENOUGH;
THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT ALL SPEECHES SHOULD BE PUBLISHED
IN FULL AND GIVEN EQUAL PROMINENCE. (THIS IS TYPICAL OF THE LINE
TAKEN AT BUDAPEST BY THE ROMANIANS WHO WITH THE YUGOSLAVS
MAINTAINED RATHER BRAVELY THEIR TRADITIONAL THESIS ABOUT THE
EQUAL RIGHTS OF EVERY PARTY GREAT OR SMALL.) A COMPROMISE SEEMS
TO HAVE BEEN REACHED: THERE WILL BE TWO DOCUMENTS, BUT THEY WILL
NOT HAVE BINDING FORCE.

11. THE ABOVE IS WHAT EMERGED FROM THE PUBLISHED SPEECHES
AND THE BRIEF COMMUNIQES. MANY OF THE THEMES WERE ECHOED AT
THE ALL-ARMY CONFERENCE OF IDEOLOGICAL WORKERS IN THE SOVIET
UNION, WHERE PONOMAREV SPOKE AGAIN ON 28 JANUARY. THE IMPRESSIONS
WHICH EMERGE ABOUT FUTURE SOVIET POLICIES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE END OF THE CSCE WILL NOT MEAN THE END OF SOVIET AND
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA FOR AN "ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM"
AND "ALL-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION". THE WEST WILL BE
URGED TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A FREEZE ON ARMED

FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TO RENOUNCE ANY PLANS FOR MILITARY
INTEGRATION IN THE EEC AND TO GO SLOW ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
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GENERALLY.

(B) THERE WILL BE A RENEWED EFFORT TO MOBILISE PUBLIC OPINION
IN THE WEST TO PRESS GOVERNMENTS TO FALL IN WITH THESE SOVIET
IDEAS.

(C) THE RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN
EUROPE WILL SEEK TO INTENSIFY THEIR CONTACTS WITH SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN THE WEST, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN POWER.

(D) EAST-WEST TRADE UNION CONTACTS WILL ALL BE VIGOROUSLY
DEVELOPED.

(E) IN BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE LOCAL
COMMUNIST PARTY WILL SEEK TO STRIKE UP AN ALLIANCE WITH
LEFT-WING SOCIALISTS, PACIFIST GROUPS AND ANY OTHERS WILLING
TO ASSOCIATE WITH THEM.

(F) THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WILL CONTINUE TO PREACH
AND PRACTISE DETENTE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, AS DEFINED BY
THEM HITHERTO.

END TEXT.

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